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THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO UCC ARTICLE 9: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
David Frisch * 
INTRODUCTION 
First, the old news. In 1998, the American Law Institute 
("ALI") and the Uniform Law Commission ("ULC")-as sponsors 
of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code")-gave their 
approval to the final text of the newest version of Article 9 ("Re-
vised Article 9") after eight years of studying, drafting, and the 
inevitable wrangling between consumer and credit representa-
tives.1 In an effort to reduce the likelihood of national non-
uniformity during the transition stage as each state moved from 
the old version to the new at its own legislative pace, the drafters 
included a provision making July 1, 2001 the effective date of Re-
vised Article 9. 2 The drafters hoped that on this date Revised Ar-
ticle 9 would become effective nationwide. That hope was, as a 
practical matter, realized as all but four states adopted the date.3 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. LL.M., Yale Law School; 
J.D., University of Miami School of Law; B.S., University of Pennsylvania. I would like to 
thank Blake Y. Boyette and the staff of the University of Richmond Law Review for their 
research and input. 
1. See C. Scott Pryor, How Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trustee's Strong-Arm into 
a Weak Finger: A Potpourri of Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 230 (2001). The 
project officially began in 1990 when the ALI and ULC appointed a committee to study 
Article 9 and recommend changes. See REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITIEE OF 
THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Dec. 1, 1992) 
[hereinafter ARTICLE 9 REPORT]; Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions Under 
Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83, 83 (1999). The committee issued its final report 
in 1992. Id. From the inception of the drafting process in 1993, consumer advocates and 
consumer credit representatives were at loggerheads. The compromise reached was that 
Revised Article 9 would leave untouched the old law for consumer transactions, except for 
some very minor changes. Thus, both sides grudgingly agreed not to oppose the statute 
when presented to the state legislatures for adoption. See id. 
2. U.C.C. § 9-701 (2009); see id.§ 9-701 cmt. (''If former Article 9 is in effect in some 
jurisdictions, and this Article is in effect in others, horrendous complications may arise."). 
3. Prefatory Note to AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9, at 1 
(Draft for Approval 2010) [hereinafter DRAFT FOR APPROVAL], http://www.iaca.org/down 
1009 
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When the study committee began its task in 1990, no one could 
foresee the extent to which the existing law would be rewritten.4 
As it turned out, the drafting committee was not content merely 
cleaning up the relatively few problematic sections of old Article 9 
and giving statutory recognition to electronic transactions. In-
stead, the drafters rewrote the entire article. Article 9 was reor-
ganized, sixty-six new sections were added, related sections of the 
Code outside of Article 9 were rewritten, and numerous substan-
tive changes were made. 5 The result was a statute that dwarfed 
its former self in both complexity and difficulty. Those acquainted 
with old Article 9, in many instances, found themselves in an un-
familiar environment. The good news was, however, that by clear-
ing up conflicting interpretations, curing judicial misconstruc-
tions, and incorporating desirable improvements that take into 
account technological developments and changes in business 
practices, the drafters did their best to provide a viable product 
for the new millennium. 
Now to the new news. With the millennium merely a decade 
old, Article 9 is once again the subject of proposed amendments. 
In 2008, the Article 9 Review Committee ("Review Committee") 
was appointed by the ALI and ULC to review the practical appli-
cation of Article 9 and decide whether its text and comments 
would benefit from revision. 6 The Review Committee identified a 
number of specific problems that needed fixing and recommended 
the appointment of a committee to draft revisions to the statute 
("Drafting Committee").7 As a result, in the fall of 2008, the ALI 
loads/2010Conference/STS/UCC9_AMdraft_JullO.pdf. The Virginia General Assembly 
enacted the new (and improved) Article 9 during its 2000 legislative session. Act of Apr. 9, 
2000, ch. 1007, 2000 Va. Acts 2296 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 8.9A-101 to 
-709 (Rep!. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2010)). As of July 1, 2001, Revised Article 9 went into 
effect in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, except for Connecticut, where it went 
into effect October 1, 2001, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42a-9-101 to -709 (2009 & Cum. Supp. 
2010), and Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, where it went into effect January 1, 2002. 
ALA. CODE§§ 7-9A-101 to -709 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
679.9-101 to -709 (2003 & Cum. Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 75-9-101 to -627 (2004 & 
Cum. Supp. 2009). 
4. Ironically, the study committee saw no need for a substantial overhaul of Article 9. 
See ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 ("[T]here seems to be little support or need for 
fundamental changes to the scope and structure of Article 9 ... .'). 
5. David Frisch, Revised Article 9: A Primer for the General Practitioner, 35 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 813, 815 (2001). 
6. Prefatory note to DRAFT FOR APPROVAL, supra note 3, at 1. 
7. See ARTICLE 9 REVIEW COMM., STATUTORY MODIFICATION ISSUES LIST 1 (June 24, 
2008), http://www.nccusl.org/Shared/Docs/ucc9/ucc9_IssuesList_June08.pdf. 
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and ULC gave the Review Committee the go ahead to begin draft-
ing.8 This was not to be a substantial overhaul of Article 9 on the 
grand scale of the Revised Article 9 project. Rather, the Review 
Committee decided at the outset that its work should conform to 
the following principles: 
We should not recommend changes that would alter policy decisions 
made during the 1998 revision unless the current provisions appear 
to be creating significant problems in practice. 
Recommendations for statutory change should focus on issues as to 
which ambiguities have been discovered in existing statutory lan-
guage, where there are substantial problems in practice under the 
current provisions, or as to which there have been significant non-
uniform amendments that suggest the need to consider revisions. 
We should recommend that an issue be handled by a revision to the 
Official Comments rather than to the statutory text whenever we be-
lieve that the statutory language is sufficiently clear and produces 
the desired result, but that judicial decisions or experience in prac-
tice indicates that some clarification might be desirable.9 
With that background, the Review Committee began drafting. 
In July 2009, the ULC gave its first reading to a draft of proposed 
amendments. 10 In May 2010, the ALI for the first time formally 
considered and approved the amendments, "subject to the discus-
sion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative."11 Next, the 
second and "final" reading by the ULC was in July 2010. 12 It is 
anticipated that the state legislative review and enactment 
process will begin in 2011.13 
8. See Prefatory Note to DRAFI' FOR APPROVAL, supra note 3, at 1. 
9. Id. 
10. See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2008--2009, at 12 (detailing the actions 
taken by the Review Committee). 
11. CURRENT PROJECTS OF UCC ARTICLE 9 REVIEW COMMITTEE, AM. LAW INST., 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=21 (last visited Mar. 2, 
2011) (explaining the approval of amendments to Article 9); see also General Meeting In-
formation, AM. LAW INST., http://2010am.ali.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (providing dates 
of 2010 annual meeting as of May 17-19, 2010). 
12. At the closing of its annual conference on July 16, 2010, ULC formally approved 
the amendments, subject to revision by the Committee on Style of the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The amendments are available at http://www. 
law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulducc9/2010am_approved.pdf. 
13. See Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, UCC Revision Committee Wrestles with Indi-
vidual Debtor Name Problem, EAGLE 9 NEWSL. Summer 2010, at 16, available at http:// 
www.eagle9.com/newsletters/newsletter_6_1.pdf (predicting state review of Amendments 
will begin in ''late 2010 and early 2011"). 
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This article examines three of the forthcoming amendments to 
Article 9 in some detail: (1) the required name of an individual on 
a financing statement; (2) the perfection of collateral following 
the debtor's relocation to a new jurisdiction; and (3) collateral ac-
quired by a new debtor. In the interest of brevity, the discussion 
of other, less noteworthy, amendments of the statutory text and 
Official Comments is not as complete. The primary purpose of 
this article is to off er guidance to legal professionals confronting 
particular issues under current and future Article 9. 
I. THE NAME OF AN INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR 
ON A FINANCING STATEMENT 
A. The Problem 
The creation of a security interest under Article 9 is embodied 
in the concept of "attachment."14 Only when it attaches does a se-
curity interest become enforceable against the debtor. 15 In a nut-
shell, this means the secured party acquires the right-after tak-
ing the necessary steps under Part 6 of Article 9-to foreclose 
upon the collateral in the event of the debtor's default. But as a 
practical matter, the advantages gained from attachment alone 
may not be sufficient to permit assertion of the security interest. 
The secured party must still be concerned about the very real 
possibility that conflicting claims to the collateral might leave its 
interest subject to subordination or termination. 16 Competing 
claimants include buyers to whom the debtor sold the collateral, 
other secured parties with a security interest in the same colla-
teral, or, as is very often the case, the debtor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy.11 
The assertion of competing claims raises the priority issue of 
how the security interest is to be ranked vis-a-vis these other 
claims. Section 9-201 states the general rule that "[e]xcept as oth-
14. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2009), which sets forth three conditions to enforceability, 
and thus to attachment. These three conditions are (1) a security agreement; (2) value giv-
en by the secured party; and (3) the debtor having rights, or the power to transfer rights, 
in the collateral. Id. In addition, Article 9 contains a statute of frauds provision that must 
be satisfied. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). 
15. Id. § 9-203(a). 
16. See id.§ 9-322 (outlining rules of priority in competing security interests). 
17. See, e.g., id. § 9-317 (giving examples of competing interests that take priority over 
security interests). 
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erwise provided in [the UCC], a security agreement is effective 
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of 
the collateral, and against creditors."18 One should not assume 
that this apparently broad statement of priority in favor of se-
cured parties is adequate to protect her interests. Unfortunately 
for secured parties, the vast number of provisions otherwise in 
Article 9 and elsewhere relegate this general priority rule to mi-
nor importance. These provisions take the form of specific priority 
rules that make the secured party's priority dependent upon "per-
fection" of the security interest. 19 For example, under section 9-
317 an attached but unperfected security interest is subordinate 
to the rights of a lien creditor. 20 Moreover, under Bankruptcy 
Code § 544(a) the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy is given the 
rights and powers of a hypothetical creditor who obtains a judicial 
lien at the date of bankruptcy, and the trustee may avoid any 
transfer of property of the debtor that is avoidable by such a judi-
cial lien creditor.21 The upshot of UCC section 9-317 and Bank-
ruptcy Code § 544(a) is to make unperfected security interests 
unenforceable in bankruptcy.22 Since most of the litigation con-
cerning security interests occurs in the bankruptcy context-
where the trustee challenges the validity of the secured party's 
interest-the stakes could not be higher. 23 If the trustee prevails, 
the secured party is relegated to the status of an unsecured credi-
tor and is paid in all too few bankruptcy dollars. 24 On the other 
18. Id. § 9-201. 
19. See, e.g., id. § 9-317 (enumerating specific conflicting interests that will have 
priority over an unperfected security interest); id. § 9-322(a)(1H2) (stating the general 
rule that a perfected security interest will have priority over a security interest that is un-
perfected or subsequently perfected). 
20. Id. § 9-317(a)(2). "A lien creditor" is a creditor with a judicial lien. Id. § 9-
102(a)(52). Revised Article 9 for the first time creates an exception to this simple race 
priority rule. An unperfected security interest will have priority if, before the claimant ac-
quires its judicial lien, the secured party satisfies one of the conditions of section 9-
203(b)(3) and also files a financing statement covering the collateral. See id. § 9-
317(a)(2)(B). 
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2006). 
22. See, e.g., Boberschmidt v. Soc'y Nat'l Bank (In re Jones), 226 F.3d 917, 921 (7th 
Cir. 2000) ("A security interest that has not been perfected prior to the filing of a bank-
ruptcy is unenforceable against the trustee." (citing In re Vitreous Steel Products Co., 911 
F.2d 1223, 1235 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
23. See, e.g., id. at 919, 921 (holding in favor of the trustee who had challenged the 
validity of the $221,295.50 payment made to the bank from the proceeds of the debtor's 
foreclosed home sale because the bank's interest was not perfected prior to the debtor's 
bankruptcy filing). 
24. See, e.g., In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners Ltd., 27 F.3d 1234, 1244 (7th Cir. 
1994) (stating that if a secured party has not perfected his interest, "then the trustee in 
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hand, a win for the secured party means that it receives the value 
of the collateral or the amount of its claim, whichever is less.25 So 
even ignoring the many other priority rules that subordinate or 
eliminate attached but unperfected security interests,26 no rea-
sonable secured party would, under any circumstances, inten-
tionally allow its security interest to remain unperfected. 
Perfection occurs when a security interest has attached and 
when the applicable perfection steps have been taken. 27 These 
steps are specified in UCC sections 9-310 through 9-316.28 For se-
curity interests in goods, the preferred method of perfection is fil-
ing a financing statement.29 For security interests in certain in-
tangible property (e.g., accounts and general intangibles) filing is 
the exclusive method of perfection.30 It is fair to say, therefore, 
that financing statements and the state filing systems in which 
they are filed are of paramount importance to the efficient opera-
tion of Article 9. 
The purpose of filing, and perfection in general, is to provide 
notice regarding the status of a debtor's property, so that those 
dealing with the debtor may protect their interest and act in a 
commercially prudent manner. The existence of a security inter-
est should be determinable under the Code before another lender 
commits itself to providing additional funding to the debtor or a 
prospective buyer makes a final decision to purchase the collater-
bankruptcy ... can subordinate or 'avoid' that interest, thus relegating it to a status of a 
general creditor of the bankruptcy estate"). 
25. For these reasons, it has been noted that "[t]he acid test for a security interest, 
lien, or mortgage is whether it can withstand challenge and avoidance in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings." John C. Minahan, Jr., Rents and Profits in Bankruptcy: A Nebraska Primer and 
Consideration of L.B. 14, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 158, 168 (1993). 
26. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-317(b), (d) (2009) (establishing that an unperfected secured 
interest is lost when collateral is purchased by non-ordinary course, good faith buyers who 
complete the process of buying "without knowledge of the security interest"); id. § 9-
322(a)(2) ("A perfected security interest ... has priority over a conflicting unperfected se-
curity interest .... "). 
27. Id. § 9-308(a). 
28. Id. 
29. See id. § 9-310(a). Perfection by taking possession of the goods is also an option, 
but, in most cases, a far less practical one. See id. §§ 9-310(b)(6), 9-313. 
30. Section 9-310(a) declares that "a financing statement must be filed to perfect all 
security interests," unless an exception to the default step of filing is applicable. Id. § 9-
310(a). For some types of collateral, such as accounts and general intangibles, there is no 
exception. It should be noted that there are a few types of collateral for which the excep-
tion to filing provides not an additional perfection method, but the exclusive perfection 
method. See, e.g., id. § 9-312(b)(l) ("[A] security interest in a deposit account may be per-
fected only by control. ... "). 
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al.31 Notwithstanding the importance of publicizing its security 
interest to third parties, the financing statement that the secured 
party is required to file will contain very little information re-
garding the secured transaction. Thus, Article 9 codifies the con-
cept of "notice filing."32 To be sufficient, a financing statement 
that does not relate real estate-related collateral must include (1) 
the name of the debtor; (2) the name of the secured party; and (3) 
an indication of the collateral covered. 33 Because financing state-
ments are indexed under the debtor's name, using the correct 
name is the key to the filing system.34 Therefore, it should come 
as no surprise that there is an ever-growing number of reported 
cases involving this simple-sounding requirement.35 One issue in 
the existing case law can be illustrated by the following not-so-
hypothetical fact pattern: The debtor's legal name is "Terrance 
Joseph Kinderknecht." The financing statement provided the deb-
tor's name as "Terry J. Kinderknecht." The debtor frequently re-
fers to himself as "Terry J. Kinderknecht" and, in fact, used that 
name when he signed his bankruptcy petition. Is the financing 
statement sufficient to perfect the secured party's interest?36 
First, we turn to section 9-503, which purports to provide guid-
ance on what constitutes the debtor's name for filing and search-
ing purposes.37 For example, if the debtor is a "registered organi-
zation"38 the name is sufficient "only if the financing statement 
31. In a few circumstances perfection occurs automatically upon attachment. Id. §§ 9-
310(b)(2), 9-309. Obviously, when this is the case, third parties must rely exclusively on 
the debtor to provide truthful information regarding the status of the collateral. These ex-
ceptions to the notice policy of perfection are supported by competing policies. 
32. This concept is thoroughly explained in Official Comment 2 to section 9-502, stat· 
ing, ''The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the 
collateral indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to dis· 
close the complete state of affairs." Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2. 
33. Id. § 9·502(a). Notwithstanding the minimal information requirements of section 
9·502, the filing officer is prohibited by section 9-520(a) from accepting a filing that does 
not contain the additional information required under section 9-516(b). Id. § 9·520(a). 
34. See id. § 9-519(c)(l), (f)(l). 
35. See, e.g., Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 73 (B.A.P. 10th 
Cir. 2004); Miller v. Van Dorn Demag Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.), No. 
03-11319C-7G, 2005 WL 1287743, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2005); In re FV Steel & 
Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004). 
36. This was the very issue facing the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in In re Kinderknecht, 308 B.R. at 72. After considering both the text of Article 9 and 
several policies that underlie the name requirement, the panel held that the secured party 
was unperfected. Id. at 72-73. 
37. U.C.C. § 9-503. 
38. A registered organization is "an organization organized solely under the law of a 
1016 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1009 
provides the name of the debtor indicated on the public record of 
the debtor's jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to 
have been organized."39 But what qualifies as a sufficient name if 
the debtor is an individual? The seemingly straightforward statu-
tory mandate that the financing statement should set forth the 
individual name of the debtor is hardly sufficient to resolve many 
of the issues that are likely to arise. 40 In the case of Mr. Kinderk-
necht, the secured party will argue that because the statute does 
not require the debtor's "legal name," the correct name can be a 
nickname or other commonly used name. Put more broadly, there 
can be several correct names, and to qualify, a name need only be 
one under which a reasonably diligent searcher might choose to 
search. 41 In response, it can be argued that since section 9-503 re-
jects a diligent searcher approach with respect to the name of reg-
istered organizations, the general policy of Revised Article 9 is 
that searching parties need only perform a single search to locate 
filed financing statements for any particular debtor. 42 Indeed, this 
is certainly the prevailing view among those experts who actively 
participated in the drafting of the revised text. For example, one 
member of the drafting committee wrote that: 
[Article 9] does not burden searchers with the obligation to dream up 
every potential error and name variation and perform searches un-
der all possibilities. Revised Article 9 allows a searcher to rely on a 
single search conducted under the correct name of the debtor and 
penalizes filers only for errors that result in nondisclosure of the fi-
nancing statement in a search under the correct name.43 
single State or the United States and as to which the State or the United States must 
maintain a public record showing the organization to have been organized." Id. § 9-
102(a)(70). Common examples of a registered organization "include corporations, limited 
partnerships, and limited liability companies." Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2. 
39. Id. § 9-503(a)(l): 
40. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A). 
41. This view is not without case law support. See, e.g., Nazar v. Bucklin Nat'l Bank 
(In re Erwin), 2003 WL 21513158, at *24 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 27, 2003) (holding that be-
cause section 9-503 does not require an individual's full legal name, the use of the debtor's 
nickname ''Mike Erwin" was sufficient to identify ''Michael A. Erwin"). 
42. U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2. 
43. Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
61, 73 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also Darrell W. Pierce, Revised Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Filing System Improvements and Their Rationale, 31 UCC L.J. 16, 
17 (1998) ("Case law that has served to protect filers at the expense of searchers by giving 
effect to filings not readily retrievable by a search will be overturned by Revised Article 9 . 
. . . and, in so doing, obviates the need for complicated search logic and multiple name 
searches."). 
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The Kinderknecht court, in denying the effectiveness of the fil-
ing,44 correctly understood the principal benefits of an exacting 
standard with respect to debtors' names. When the need to con-
duct multiple searches using variations of the debtor's name is 
eliminated, this provides more certainty in the commercial world 
and reduces litigation.45 Moreover, placing the responsibility to 
investigate and use the exact name of a debtor upon secured par-
ties does not seem unduly burdensome in light of the fact that a 
reasonably prudent creditor has access to that information.46 
Assuming that all courts can be persuaded that a legal name 
requirement for individuals makes perfect sense and accurately 
reflects the drafters' appreciation of the utility that such an ap-
proach would provide, would this settle all the questions sur-
rounding the correct name for individuals?47 The simple answer is 
that it would not. Uncertainty would continue to plague secured 
parties in their quest for the debtor's so-called legal name in 
many situations where the debtor legally uses or has used more 
than one name.48 For example, which name would the secured 
party use if the debtor's name on her birth certificate does not 
match the name on her social security card, which in turn does 
not match the name on her driver's license? To further complicate 
matters, suppose the debtor continues to use her name for busi-
ness purposes, but adopts her husband's surname when the pur-
44. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 76-77 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2004). 
45. See id. at 75-76; see also In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390, 394 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2004) (holding that "[a] rule that would burden a searcher with guessing at 
misspellings and various configurations of a legal name would" decrease the certainty de-
sirable in commercial transactions and that the burden of filing under the correct name is 
properly on the filer (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Lacon v. Strong, 663 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1996))). Even in those cases where the secured party files under an incorrect 
name, all is not necessarily lost. Section 9-506(c) provides a safe harbor rule that would 
save a filing with an erroneous debtor name "[i]f a search of the records of the filing office 
under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if any, 
would disclose" the filing. U.C.C. § 9-506(c). 
46. See In re Kinderknecht, 308 B.R. at 76. 
4 7. It should be noted that however the problem of individual names is resolved, that 
same solution would presumably apply when the financing statement is required to give 
the name of an individual trustee or settlor of a trust, see U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(3), or a dece-
dent, see id. § 9-503(a)(2), or an individual member of an organization without a name, see 
id. § 9-503(a)(4)(B). 
48. Cf Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Bodenstedt, 104 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Neb. 1960) (ci-
tation omitted) (explaining that a person can use any name to "transact business, execute 
contracts, and carry on his affairs, unless he does so in order to defraud others''). 
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pose is personal. What name then?49 It is to the Drafting Commit-
tee's solution that we now turn. 
B. The Solution 
Balancing competing policy concerns, the Review Committee 
opted in favor of producing two alternative approaches to the 
problem of individual debtor names from which states may 
choose. The first alternative requires filings against the name of 
the debtor as stated on the most recent unexpired driver's li-
cense.50 This approach clearly reduces the risks and burdens of 
determining the debtor's correct name on the secured party who 
files and the third party who searches. If the debtor does not have 
a current license, then the test for sufficiency will remain what it 
was before (unclear) but with what misleadingly appears to be a 
safe harbor. A filing will be sufficient if it uses the debtor's sur-
name and first personal name.51 But what is the debtor's first per-
sonal name? Would "Terry'' qualify as Mr. Kinderknecht's first 
name? And what is the debtor's correct surname? Could it be the 
debtor's maiden name if used for business purposes only? It was 
hoped that the Official Comments would offer guidance on these 
issues, but alas, there is only silence.52 
The second alternative does little to reduce the current uncer-
tainty facing searchers, but does provide comfort to those who 
file. A filing will be sufficient if it uses the name as it appears on 
the debtor's current driver's license, but there is no requirement 
49. Several states, including Virginia, have responded to this problem by enacting 
non-uniform amendments to their versions of Article 9. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-
503(a)(4), (f) (Supp. 2010); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503(a)(4) (West Supp. 2009); 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.9A-503(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2010). The Article 9 Review Committee rec-
ognized that other filing issues included "those relating to foreign individual names, 
names in foreign alphabets and accented, hyphenated or like names that may challenge a 
filing office's indexing or search logic." ARTICLE 9 REVIEW COMM., supra note 7, at 3 n.3. 
50. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A) (Approved Amendments 2010). Because the law that 
governs perfection is the law of the state in which the debtor maintains her principal resi-
dence, see id. § 9-301(1) (2009), the license that matters is the one issued by this state. The 
amended Official Comments to section 9-503 make the point that the name used in the 
financing statement must be exactly the same as the name on the driver's license. Id. § 9-
503 cmt. 2d (Approved Amendments 2010). Thus, if the name on the license is "Joseph Al-
lan Jones," a filing against "Joseph Jones" or "Joseph A. Jones" would not be sufficient. 
See id. 
51. Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
52. See id. § 9-503 cmt. 2d ("In disputes as to whether a financing statement suffi-
ciently provides the 'individual name' of a debtor, a court should refer to any non-UCC law 
concerning names."). 
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that the secured party use this name. 53 It is merely a safe harbor 
for secured parties. The debtor's individual name would also suf-
fice, as would the debtor's surname and first personal name.54 
Thus, in those states adopting this alternative, searchers must 
search under the name on the driver's license and would be wise 
to search under other names that the debtor is known to use. 
II. COLLATERAL ACQUIRED BY A DEBTOR FOLLOWING RELOCATION 
A. The Problem 
Under the rules of Revised Article 9, all financing statements 
are filed in the jurisdiction of the debtor's location.55 But in order 
to determine where the debtor is located, one must consult section 
9-307. If the debtor is incorporated or otherwise organized as a 
registered organization, its location is the state in which it is reg-
istered. 56 If the debtor is an unregistered entity, it is located in 
the state in which it maintains its chief executive office. 57 The lo-
cation of an individual is his or her principal residence. 58 
So far, so good. But what happens if the debtor subsequently 
changes its location to another jurisdiction? Consider the follow-
ing example: 
Example 1: Debtor is an individual who resides in Virginia and 
is the sole proprietor of a hardware store. Debtor grants to Lend-
er a security interest in specific items of equipment. Lender prop-
erly perfects by filing its financing statement in Virginia. Debtor 
then relocates to North Carolina. 
The relocation of Debtor's principal residence to North Carolina 
constitutes a change in Debtor's location and, therefore, a change 
in the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection. Section 9-
316(a) provides that the security interest remains perfected for 
four months after the change,59 and is continuously perfected un-
der section 9-316(b) if it is perfected in the new location within 
53. See id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. B). 
54. See id. 
55. See id. § 9-301(1) (2009). 
56. See id. § 9-307(e). 
57. See id.§ 9-307(b)(3). 
58. See id. § 9-307(b)(l). 
59. See id. § 9-316(a)(2). 
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the four-month period.60 If it is not perfected within that period, 
"the security interest . . . becomes unperfected and is deemed 
never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the colla-
teral for value."61 Thus, in the foregoing example, Lender is given 
four months to discover that Debtor has moved and perfect in 
North Carolina if it wishes to maintain its security interest with-
out a lapse in perfection.62 The failure to reperfect within the sta-
tutory grace period does not just mean that Lender's security in-
terest becomes vulnerable to competing interests that come into 
existence after that period expires (when the security interest is 
no longer perfected), it also means that Lender's priority over in-
terests that attached before or within the four-month period 
might be lost. 63 
The consequence of all this for the secured party is that it must 
periodically monitor the location of the debtor. A third party who 
is interested in the debtor's title to the collateral needs to ascer-
tain whether the debtor has changed its location within the pre-
vious four months. If it has, the third party must search for fil-
ings in the state where the debtor is currently located and in its 
former state of location. This seems to be a fair compromise. 
Example 2: Under the facts of Example 1, Debtor has also 
granted to Lender a security interest in Debtor's existing and af-
ter-acquired inventory. After Debtor moves to North Carolina, he 
continues to acquire new inventory to which Lender's security in-
terest attaches. 
Because Debtor is now located in North Carolina, Lender will 
need to take the necessary steps for perfection in that state. As 
60. Id. § 9-316(b). 
61. Id. 
62. This four-month fixed period assumes that the filing in Virginia does not for some 
reason become ineffective before then. If it does, and if Lender had not yet filed in North 
Carolina, its perfection would be lost, even if the four-month period had not yet expired. 
See id. § 9-316(a). 
63. This is because, as against a purchaser for value, the failure to reperfect during 
the four-month grace period results in a retroactive loss of perfection. Id.§ 9-316(b). Under 
section 1-201(a)(30), a "purchaser" includes any person who has acquired an interest in 
the collateral by virtue of a consensual transaction with the debtor. See id. § 1-201(a)(30). 
This would include secured parties. Yet, what policy justifies a reversal of priorities upon 
Lender's failure to reperfect? The answer is far from obvious. See David Frisch, The Impli-
cit 'Takings" Jurisprudence of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 11, 36 n.118 (1995) (suggesting a justification for this reversal of priorities is that it 
provides a "method for untangling the circular priority dispute that would arise if the 
Code permitted [Lender] to retain its priority''). 
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indicated in the discussion following Example 1, the security in-
terest perfected by the filing in Virginia continues to be perfected 
for four months following the Debtor's relocation. Note that sec-
tion 9-316(a) limits this grace period to security interests that are 
perfected prior to Debtor's relocation to the new jurisdiction.64 
Thus, the four-month rule has no application to security interests 
that have not attached before the location changes. The result is 
that Lender's security interest in the store's inventory on the re-
location date will remain perfected for four months, but as to 
those items acquired by Debtor after relocating to North Caroli-
na, the security interest will remain unperfected until Lender 
files in North Carolina. 
Observe that section 9-316(a) significantly increases the bur-
den on the secured party to monitor the debtor when the security 
interest extends to any type of after-acquired collateral.65 Lender 
in Example 1 need only check on the location of Debtor every four 
months to ensure that its security interest remains perfected, 
whereas Lender in the present example is never really safe. The 
problem is exacerbated when, as here, the collateral is the type 
that turns over continually and for which it would make little 
commercial sense for the secured party to be content with a secu-
rity interest that was perfected only in the inventory that was on 
hand at the time of Debtor's relocation. What accounts for impos-
ing a greater burden on the secured party with respect to post-
location collateral than with respect to pre-location collateral? 
Should Amended Article 9 take a different approach? The Draft-
ing Committee's answer was yes. 
B. The Solution 
Amended Article 9 reflects the drafter's appreciation that little 
is to be gained by a four-month rule that draws a sharp distinc-
tion between collateral acquired by the debtor prior to its reloca-
tion to another jurisdiction and collateral acquired after reloca-
tion. The current grace period enjoyed by secured parties supplies 
a strong incentive for third parties to check for filings in the state 
where the debtor was previously located, notwithstanding the fact 
that the filing would be ineffective to perfect a security interest in 
64. See U.C.C. § 9-316(a). 
65. See id. 
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collateral acquired after the debtor's relocation to the new state. 
Thus, it is unlikely that expanding the scope of the grace period 
to include all collateral would have much, if any, impact on the 
search burden imposed on third parties. But it would significantly 
reduce the monitoring burden on secured parties. 
To achieve this more efficient balancing of burdens, the draf-
ters of Amended Article 9 have added a new subsection (h) to sec-
tion 9-316.66 No longer will it matter when the security interest 
attaches. The filing in the original state will be effective for all 
collateral for four months.67 
III. COLLATERAL ACQUIRED BY A NEW DEBTOR 
A. The Problem 
In Revised Article 9 terminology, a "new debtor" is "a person 
that becomes bound as debtor under Section 9-203(d) by a securi-
ty agreement previously entered into by another person."68 What 
makes new debtor status significant is that the existing security 
agreement would give the secured party a security interest in the 
new debtor's existing and after-acquired collateral of the kinds 
described in the security agreement. Simply put, the new debtor 
is treated as if it were the original debtor.69 When does this occur? 
Section 9-203(d) tells us that: 
A person becomes bound as [a] debtor by a security agreement en-
tered into by another person if, [either] by operation of law ... or by 
contract: 
66. See id. § 9-316(h) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
67. Id. The Reporter's Note to amended section 9-316 explains the reason for the 
change: 
Given the risks faced by an existing secured party whose security interest 
in property acquired by the debtor after relocation is unperfected and the li-
kelihood that a later purchaser would in any event investigate the pedigree of 
the affected property and search for filings in the original state, the [drafting 
committee] decided that the benefits to the existing secured party in not hav-
ing to monitor the debtor more frequently than every four months for a 
change of location outweigh the burden placed on purchasers of the affected 
property. 
U.C.C. § 9-316 reporter's note 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 11, 2010). 
68. Id. § 9-102(a)(56) (2009). The person who previously entered into the security 
agreement is called the "original debtor." Id.§ 9-102(a)(60). 
69. See id. § 9-203(e). 
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(1) the security agreement becomes effective to create a securi-
ty interest in the person's property; or 
(2) the person becomes generally obligated for the obligations 
of the other person, including the obligation secured under the 
security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substan-
tially all of the assets of the other person.70 
1023 
Now, consider an example drawn from the facts of Example 5 
in the Official Comments to section 9-316: 
Debtor is a Pennsylvania corporation. Debtor grants to Lender a se-
curity interest in Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. 
Lender perfects by filing in Pennsylvania. Debtor's shareholders de-
cide to "reincorporate" in Delaware. They form a Delaware corpora-
tion (Newcorp) into which they merge Debtor. By virtue of the mer-
ger, Newcorp becomes bound by Debtor's security agreement. After 
the merger, Newcorp acquires inventory to which Lender's security 
interest attaches.71 
It may seem, at first glance, that this fact pattern is no differ-
ent from that discussed in the preceding Part. That is, we have, 
in effect, a relocation of Debtor from Pennsylvania to Delaware. 
But here there is an important difference. The difference results 
from the simple fact that Newcorp is a different juridical person 
from Debtor. Under these circumstances, the applicable rule is 
found, not in section 9-316(a)(2), but rather, in section 9-316(a)(3). 
That section provides for a one-year grace period (assuming that 
the Pennsylvania filing does not lapse before then) when collater-
al is transferred to a person "that thereby becomes a debtor" and 
is located in another jurisdiction. 72 Thus, as to the inventory ac-
tually transferred by Debtor to Newcorp, Lender would have one 
year to file in Delaware. 
70. Id. § 9-203(d). Comment 3 to section 9-508 provides several examples of how sec-
tion 9-203(d) would operate in the merger context. One is particularly helpful. 
[S]ome corporate laws provide that, when two corporations merge, the surviv-
ing corporation succeeds to the assets of its merger partner and "has all lia-
bilities" of both corporations. In the case where, for example, A Corp merges 
into B Corp (and A Corp ceases to exist), some people have questioned wheth-
er A Corp's grant of a security interest in its existing and after-acquired 
property becomes a ''liability" of B Corp, such that B Corp's existing and af-
ter-acquired property becomes ... subject to a security interest in favor of A 
Corp's lender. Even if corporate law were to give a negative answer, under 
Section 9-203(d)(2), B Corp would become bound for purposes of Section 9-
203(e) and this section. 
Id. § 9-508 cmt. 3. 
71. Id.§ 9-316 cmt. 2 (internal citation omitted). 
72. Id. § 9-316(a)(3). 
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As we have seen in the discussion of the four-month grace pe-
riod governing relocations, current section 9-316 does not help the 
secured party if the security interest first attaches after the relo-
cation. 73 The same is true here, where a new debtor is located in 
another jurisdiction. Lender's security interest in property ac-
quired by Newcorp would be unperfected until Lender files an 
otherwise effective financing statement in Delaware. The practic-
al problem for the secured party is that the new debtor may come 
into existence under circumstances that go unnoticed by even the 
most diligent lender and not signal the need to take steps to 
maintain the perfected status of its security interest in after-
acquired property. Such might be the case where the new debtor 
results from a restructuring of the debtor's business that involves 
little more than paperwork. 
B. The Solution 
Nothing in the Article 9 amendments changes the existing one-
year grace period for collateral that was transferred by the origi-
nal debtor to the new debtor. Added to section 9-316, however, is 
subsection (i) that treats after-acquired collateral in the same 
way that new subsection (h) treats such collateral following the 
debtor's relocation. 74 The original filing will continue its job of per-
fecting the secured party's interest for four months. 
One additional point remains. Assume in the previous example 
that Newcorp had been an established business with inventory 
prior to the merger with Debtor. When it becomes bound by the 
security of Debtor, Lender's security interest will attach to the 
pre-merger inventory and, under subsection (i), that interest will 
now also be perfected for four months without a filing in Dela-
ware.75 
73. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
74. Compare U.C.C. § 9-316(i) (Approved Amendments 2010) (making financing 
statements effective to perfect security interests in after-acquired collateral for four 
months in instances where the statement would have been effective had it been acquired 
by the original debtor), with id. § 9-316(h) (making financing statements effective to per-
fect interests for four months in instances where the statement would have been effective 
had the debtor not changed its location). 
75. This new rule necessitated a conforming amendment to section 9-326. See id. § 9-
326(a). Suppose, in our example, that Newcorp had granted a security interest in its in-
ventory to a competing secured party ("SP2') who filed against Newcorp in Delaware. Who 
would have the priority interest in the inventory? Lender would have priority as to the 
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IV. CORRECTION STATEMENTS 
A. The Problem 
Under the current version of UCC section 9-518, the debtor is 
given a nonjudicial method for providing notice to third parties 
that a financing statement or other record is inaccurate or wrong-
fully filed. 76 Now that financing statements can be filed without 
the debtor's signature, it certainly makes sense for the statute to 
give the debtor an opportunity to respond to unauthorized fil-
ings. 77 The debtor can file what is called a "correction statement." 
In this statement, the debtor will indicate why he believes that 
there is an error or a wrongful filing and what steps should be 
taken to eliminate the error.78 It is important to understand that 
although the correction statement is now considered to be part of 
the financing statement,79 it in no way negates its effectiveness.80 
The Official Comments to section 9-518 point out that this reme-
dy is analogous to the opportunity afforded consumers to correct 
an erroneous credit report under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.81 
By way of contrast, suppose that it is not the debtor who has 
reason to object to a filing, but rather, it is a secured party of 
record. Such would be the case, for example, if the debtor or a 
competing creditor were to improperly file a statement that pur-
ports to terminate the secured party's financing statement.82 Al-
though the termination statement would not impair the effective-
ness of the filed financing statement, 83 the secured party may 
inventory obtained from Debtor, but section 9-326 would give SP2 priority as to the after-
acquired and pre-merger inventory. See id.§ 9-326(b). 
76. See id. § 9-518 (2009). 
77. Although the financing statement need not be signed to be sufficient, see id. § 9-
502(a), the filing is not effective unless it is authorized by the debtor in an authenticated 
record, see id. § 9-509(a)(l). 
78. Id. § 9-518(b)(3). 
79. See id. § 9-102(a)(39) (The term "financing statement" includes "any filed record 
relating to the initial financing statement."). 
80. See id. § 9-518(c). 
81. Id. § 9-518 cmt. 2 (citing Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 
1128 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2006)). In addition to filing a correction state-
ment under section 9-518, the debtor may be able to recover actual damages and a $500 
civil penalty from the person responsible for the inaccurate or wrongful filing. See id. § 9-
625(b), (e). 
82. A "termination statement" does not need the signature of the secured party of 
record. See id.§ 9-513. 
83. See id. §§ 9-509(d), 9-510(a), 9-519(g). For a recent case that mistakenly held to 
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wish to avoid later litigation by giving notice to third parties of its 
continuing interest.84 Unfortunately, a correction statement can 
only be filed by the debtor. 85 Unless the secured party can con-
vince the debtor to file such a statement on its behalf, third par-
ties who rely on the public record do so at their peril. 
B. The Solution 
Amended Article 9 adds a new subsection (c) to section 9-518, 
which allows filing of what is now termed an "information state-
ment" by "a secured party of record with respect to the financing 
statement to which the record relates and [who] believes that the 
person who filed the record was not entitled to do so under Sec-
tion 9-509(d)."86 Thus, no longer would it be necessary for the se-
cured party to urge the cooperation of the debtor to correct the 
record. Although the information statement would not alter the 
effectiveness of the termination statement, the risk of there being 
a secret lien would be eliminated. 
V. RATIFICATION OF AN UNAUTHORIZED FINANCING STATEMENT 
A. The Problem 
As noted earlier, section 9-502(a) deletes the traditional re-
quirement that the debtor's signature must appear on a financing 
statement.87 Under this provision the financing statement need 
only state the name of the debtor.88 Section 9-509(a)(l) allows a 
person to file an initial financing statement only if "the debtor au-
thorizes the filing in an authenticated record."89 If the secured 
the contrary, see People's Bank of Ky. v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re S.J. Cox Enters.), No. 07-
50705, 2009 WL 939573, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2009) (''The termination of a fi-
nancing statement, even if mistaken, releases the secured creditor's lien against the deb-
tor's property." (citing Crestar Bank v. Neal (In re Kitchin Equip. Co. of Va., Inc.), 960 
F.2d 1242, 1245 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
84. See U.C.C. § 9-518 cmt. 2 (Approved Amendments 2010). 
85. See id. § 9-518(a) & cmt. 2 (2009) (speaking only in terms of "the debtor"). 
86. Id. § 9-518(c) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
87. Id. § 9-502(a) & cmt. 3 (2009). 
88. Id. § 9-502(a)(l). 
89. Id. § 9-509(a)(l). 
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party files a financing statement without the requisite authoriza-
tion by the debtor, the filing is ineffective.90 
Assume that when the financing statement was first filed by 
the secured party, the debtor had not yet authorized the filing in 
an authenticated record. Then, sometime later, the debtor signs a 
security agreement. Section 9-509(b) provides: "By authenticat-
ing ... a security agreement, a debtor ... authorizes the filing of 
an initial financing statement, and an amendment, covering ... 
the collateral described in the security agreement .... "91 
The first issue raised by this fact pattern is whether the sign-
ing of the security agreement retroactively authorizes the prior 
filing, or whether a new filing is required. The Code does not say, 
but comment 3 to section 9-509 suggests that the concept of rati-
fication would serve to make the prior filing effective.92 The 
second issue is a bit trickier. Suppose that a second secured party 
files against the same collateral before the earlier filing is rati-
fied. For purposes of the priority rule based upon time of filing, 93 
does the ratification make the initial financing statement effec-
tive as of the filing date? Or is the financing statement only effec-
tive as of the date of the security agreement? It would seem that 
ratification should make the financing statement effective from 
the time of filing for all purposes. After all, the second secured 
party presumably was aware of the earlier filing and should have 
taken whatever steps it thought necessary to protect its interests. 
But until Amended Article 9 takes effect, the result is uncertain. 
B. The Solution 
The response of the Drafting Committee to this problem and 
the last remaining problem to be discussed in this article was not 
to tinker with the statutory text, but rather, to add clarifying 
language to the official comments. The language is as follows: 
90. See id. § 9-510(a) ("A filed record is effective only to the extent that it was filed by 
a person that may file it under Section 9-509."). Moreover, the debtor is entitled to com-
pensatory damages under section 9-625(b) and statutory damages under section 9-625 
(e)(3). See id. § 9-625(b), (e)(3). 
91. Id. § 9-509(b)(l). 
92. See id. § 9-509 cmt. 3 (''Law other than this Article, including the law with respect 
to ratification of past acts, generally determines whether a person has the requisite au-
thority to file a record under this section."). 
93. See id. § 9-322(a)(l) ("Conflicting perfected security interests ... rank according to 
priority in time of filing or perfection."). 
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Under a notice-filing system, a filed financing statement indicates to 
third parties that a person may have a security interest in the colla-
teral indicated. With further inquiry, they may discover the complete 
state of affairs. When a financing statement that is ineffective when 
filed becomes effective thereafter, the policy underlying the notice-
filing system determines the "time of filing" for purposes of [section 
9-322(a)(l)]. For example, the unauthorized filing of an otherwise 
sufficient initial financing statement becomes authorized, and the fi-
nancing statement becomes effective, upon the debtor's post-filing 
authorization or ratification of the filing. Because the authorization 
or ratification does not increase the notice value of the financing 
statement, the time of the unauthorized filing is the "time of filing'' 
for purposes of subsection (a)(l). The same policy applies to the other 
priority rules in this part.94 
A brief comment on the Review Committee's decision to ad-
dress specific problems in the comments is in order. The most ob-
vious point is that, although comments play an extremely promi-
nent role in Code interpretation, they are not part of the 
statutory text, nor are they legislative history of the enacting 
state legislatures in the usual sense.95 The point is significant in 
those instances where the comment goes beyond or does not fit 
the statutory text. Here courts ought to be extremely cautious in 
attributing persuasive weight to the comment. By following a 
comment on a matter that does not appear in the text, courts risk 
carrying out policies that cannot be tied to any legislative judg-
ment. The problem has arisen in many cases where the comments 
seem designed to function more as legislation than merely as a 
means of discerning the meaning of statutory language.96 
94. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 4 (Approved Amendments 2010) (internal citation omitted). 
95. To be sure, "[t]he courts take to the comments like ducks to water, even though 
the legislatures did not enact the comments." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 5, at 13 (5th ed. 2000); see also 
Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments, 
and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REV. 993, 1013 (1995) ("Courts have cited the comments thou-
sands of times, often affording them great weight."); Sean Michael Hannaway, Note, The 
Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 975 (1990) ("In the great majority of cases, courts cite the 
(c]omments to support the application or purpose described in them."). 
96. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 95, at 13-14 ("[T]he comments depart 
from the text in two different ways. They sometimes expand on, and therefore go beyond 
the text, and they sometimes restrict or narrow the meaning of the text."); Hannaway, su-
pra note 95, at 975-85 (discussing several instances where the "[c]omments [are] [a]cting 
as Code'). The point is explicitly recognized by the New York Law Revision Commission in 
its criticism of the comments: 
A more serious objection arises from instances in which the [c]omments ap-
pear to qualify the text or to add further rules not supported by the text. (See, 
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An example of the central idea here is former comment 3 to 
section 2-507.97 Section 2-507(2) gives a seller the right to reclaim 
goods from a cash buyer who has paid with a "rubber check."98 
But unlike section 2-702(2), which permits a seller to recover 
goods from a credit buyer who has received the goods while insol-
vent, section 2-507(2) is silent on the question of when demand 
for reclamation must occur.99 Before it was amended in 1990, 
comment 3 to section 2-507 contained an unexplained assertion: 
"The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which the 
seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer 
is also applicable here."100 Relying on this comment, several courts 
have unhesitatingly imposed a ten-day limit on reclamation ap-
plicable to cash sales.101 
e.g., Comments 1, 6, and 9 to Section 1-205, Comment 2 to Section 2-205, 
Comments 4, 8, and 13 to Section 2-320, Comments 1 and 2 to Section 2-508, 
Comment 4 to Section 2-509, Comment 5 to Section 2-607, Comment 2 to Sec-
tion 3-510, Comment 2 to Section 4-212, Comment 9 to Section 4-403, Com-
ments 1 and 4 to Section 7-501, Comment to Section 8-303, Comment 3 to 
Section 8-313, Comment 8 to Section 9-204, Comment 5 to Section 9-318.) 
N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N for 
1956, at 26 (1956). 
97. See U.C.C. § 2-507 cmt. 3 (1978). 
98. See id. § 2-507(2) (2009). Even though payment is by check, the transaction is con-
sidered to be a cash sale. No credit is extended. See Stowers v. Mahon (Jn re Samuels & 
Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976). In such cases, section 2-507(2) provides that 
"[w]here payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents 
of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his 
making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507(2). Under section 2-511(3), "payment by check is 
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due pre-
sentment." Id. § 2-511(3). 
99. Section 2-702(2) provides in pertinent part: 
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while 
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after 
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the partic-
ular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limita-
tion does not apply. 
Id.§ 2-702(2). 
100. Id. § 2-507 cmt. 3 (1978). In 1990, The Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") for the 
Uniform Commercial Code amended comment 3 by deleting the reference to a ten-day li-
mitation and substituting in its place an explicit statement that "[t]here is no specific time 
limit for a cash seller to exercise the right of reclamation." PEB Commentary on the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Commentary No. 1 (1990). 
101. See, e.g., Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980) ("We hold that 
the ten day limitation period contained in [c]omment 3 provides a more certain guide for 
conducting commercial transactions than the common law yardstick of "reasonableness," 
and that it will encourage cash sellers to make prompt presentment. Any extension of the 
ten day limitation period based on the realities of the commercial banking world is for the 
legislature, not this Court."). Analytically, the court's opinion is unsatisfying. As Professor 
Walker notes: "[T]he First Circuit announced the curious view that the comment merited 
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It is clear that there are potential benefits to be gained from 
the comments. The task for any drafting committee and its re-
porter is to take an appropriate approach to the comments to en-
sure that such gains are realized. It is one thing to justify the use 
of comments generally. It is quite another, however, to determine 
the particular fit between text and comments on a particular is-
sue. Insofar as the question of allocation is concerned, the deci-
sion to address its effects in a comment, rather than the text, is 
probably of little significance since the courts would seemingly 
reach the suggested approach, even without specific guidance. On 
the other hand, the same cannot be said for the problem dis-
cussed in the next Part of this article. 
VI. THE COMMERCIAL MONEY CENTER CASE 
A The Problem 
In re Commercial Money Center, Inc. illustrates the problem of 
"stripping'' for which there is currently no "right" statutory solu-
tion.102 In this case, Commercial Money Center, Inc. ("CMCI") was 
in the business of leasing equipment. 103 It would package groups 
of leases together and assign only its right to receive future ren-
tals to various entities, thus "stripping'' the anticipated payment 
streams from the remainder of the leases. 104 
In CMCI's bankruptcy, the trustee sought to avoid the transfer 
of the payment streams using the "strong arm" clause codified in 
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(l). 105 The assignee argued that under 
the personal property categorization scheme of Article 9, the un-
weight and should only be changed by legislation, even though the comment itself had 
never been enacted." Walker, supra note 95, at 1015. Now that the PEB (a nonlegislative 
body) has acted to change the comment one wonders whether the First Circuit would, if 
presented with the same issue today, reach a different conclusion. 
102. Kipperman v. Netbank, FSB (Jn re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.), No. 02-09721, 
2005 WL 1365055 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2005), affd in part, 350 B.R. 465, (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2006). Compare, for example, the opposing declarations of expert witnesses and co-
reporters for Revised Article 9, Charles W. Mooney, Jr. and Steven L. Harris, which the 
bankruptcy court excluded. See In re Commercial Money Ctr., 350 B.R. at 480 n.12. 
103. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 2005 WL 1365055, at *l. 
104. Id. 
105. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 350 B.R. at 472. The strong arm clause gives the 
bankruptcy trustee the rights and powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544(a)(l) (2006). Since, under governing law, an unperfected security interest would be 
subordinate to a judicial lien, U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2009), section 544(a)(l) empowers 
the trustee to avoid the unperfected security interest. 
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derlying transactions involved the sale of payment intangibles. 106 
As such, the assignee's interest in the payment streams was au-
tomatically perfected upon attachment under Code section 9-
309(3).107 The trustee, however, argued the transaction was not a 
sale of payment intangibles, but was instead either a loan or a 
transfer of an interest in chattel paper. 108 In that case, the assig-
nee's interest in the payment streams could be perfected only by 
filing under section 9-312(a) or by taking possession of the lease 
agreements under section 9-313(a). 109 Thus, a key issue in the 
case became the threshold matter of identifying the proper cha-
racterization of the transaction under the elaborate provisions of 
the ucc.110 
The bankruptcy court held for the trustee. 111 On appeal, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit ("B.A.P.") disa-
greed with the lower court as to the nature of the collateral.112 The 
panel opined that the payment streams, having been stripped 
from the underlying chattel paper, reduced the transaction to the 
transfer of an interest in payment intangibles, for which automat-
ic perfection was unavailable because the transaction was a 
loan.113 
This latter conclusion is problematic. At the very least, pay-
ment stripping may have a detrimental effect on the ability to 
know one's priority in purchased or pledged chattel paper, as illu-
strated by the following example. Suppose that on March 1, Deb-
tor leases equipment to X; on April 1, Secured Party 1 ("SPl") ac-
quires a security interest, perfected by filing, in the lease; and on 
June 1, Secured Party 2 ("SP2") purchases the lease for new value 
106. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 2005 WL 1365055, at *2. '"Payment intangible' 
means a general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a 
monetary obligation." U.C.C. § 9-102(61). 
107. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 2005 WL 1365055, at *l. 
108. Id. Chattel paper includes "a record or records that evidence both a monetary obli-
gation and ... a lease of specific goods .... [Under this definition], 'monetary obligation' 
means a monetary obligation ... owed under a lease of [specific] goods .... " U.C.C. § 9-
102(11). 
109. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 2005 WL 1365055, at *2. 
no. Id. 
lll. Id. at *4. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court ruled that even if the payment 
streams were severable from the underlying leases, the automatic perfection rule of sec-
tion 9-309(3) would nevertheless not apply because the true nature of the transactions 
were loans, not sales. Id. at *7, *11. 
ll2. In re Commercial Money Ctr., 350 B.R. at 469. 
ll3. Id. 
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and takes possession of the paper. 114 Under section 9-330(a) or (b), 
the purchaser can achieve priority over the earlier-in-time securi-
ty interest. 115 Even if priority were not obtainable, SP2 should not 
have been misled because it could have easily learned of the ear-
lier security interest by checking for UCC filings. Now, changing 
the facts, assume instead that the payment stream is permissibly 
stripped from the underlying lease and sold to SPl in its new 
form as a payment intangible. As noted, SPl's interest would be 
automatically perfected and no filing would be necessary. 116 This 
creates some complexities for determining priority as to the pay-
ment stream. If section 9-330 is applied, SP2 would presumably 
have priority. But the application of section 9-330 in this context 
is open to question. Both subsections (a) and (b) accord the later-
in-time chattel paper purchaser "priority over a security interest 
in the chattel paper."111 No hint is given whether this same later-
in-time priority would apply if the earlier interest was a payment 
intangible. 118 If not, any subsequent buyer of, or party secured by, 
Debtor's chattel paper would always run the risk-realized 
here-that it would have no meaningful interest in the chattel 
paper. 119 This risk should negatively impact the value that third 
parties place on Debtor's chattel paper. 120 
114. Keep in mind that the term "purchaser" is broadly defined in the Code to include 
one whose interest secures an obligation. See U.C.C. § 1·201(30) (2009). 
115. Under section 9-330(a), the purchaser can achieve priority over a competing secu-
rity interest "which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security inter-
est if ... the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified as-
signee other than the purchaser." Id. § 9-330(a)(2). Subsection (b) applies if the security 
interest is not claimed "merely as proceeds." Id. § 9-330(b). In that case, the purchaser can 
achieve priority if it buys or takes its security interest "without knowledge that the pur-
chase violates the rights of the secured party." Id. 
116. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
117. U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b). 
118. The B.A.P. in In re Commercial Money Center, Inc. was not unaware of this issue 
but chose to leave its resolution for another day. See In re Commercial Money Ctr., 350 
B.R. at 480 ("We explicitly decline to resolve this ambiguity in Revised U.C.C. Section 9-
330(b) .... "). 
119. Note that one in the position of SP2 will almost surely ask Debtor to represent and 
warrant that the payment stream had not been previously stripped from the chattel paper, 
but if Debtor breaches this promise, SP2 will hold only an unsecured claim for damages. 
120. This problem of uncertain priorities and the consequent devaluation of property 
has to be faced whenever automatic perfection is permitted. Thus, section 9-309(3) should 
give pause to any party contemplating a transaction involving payment intangibles. For 
all she knows, they have already been sold. 
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B. The Solution 
Amended Article 9 attempts to solve the foregoing problem by 
amending the Official Comment rather than the statute. In a one-
sentence addition to section 9-102 comment 5(d), the point is 
made that even if the rental stream is separated, the rental 
stream is still "chattel paper."121 Given the current textual ambi-
guity on this point and the fact that application of the approach 
espoused by the new comment may yield results that some find 
objectionable, it is not surprising that the Drafting Committee 
would hesitate to confront the detractors head-on by amending 
several provisions of the statute. Still, despite its simplicity and 
relative ease of application, there are several reasons to be less 
than sanguine that the comment will succeed in putting the issue 
to rest. 
First, nothing compels a court to embrace the comment if it 
does not believe that the comment states a correct interpretation 
of the Code, as currently drafted. 122 Moreover, are we to necessari-
ly assume that a single sentence in the comment will have more 
persuasive force than the B.A.P.'s analysis in Commercial Money 
Center? 
Second, the new comment is in a paragraph that begins with a 
statement that "[a] right to the payment of money is frequently 
buttressed by ancillary rights" and goes on to say that Article 9 
"does not treat these ancillary rights separately from the rights to 
payment to which they relate.''123 What if the lessee has payment 
obligations in addition to the obligation to pay rent (e.g., an obli-
gation to pay for insurance)? Would these obligations be consi-
dered ancillary and therefore within the scope of the interest 
transferred to the secured party? 
121. The sentence reads as follows: "Contrary to the opinion in In re Commercial Mon· 
ey Center, Inc., ... if the lessor's rights under a lease constitute chattel paper, an assign-
ment of the lessor's right to payment under the lease also would be an assignment of chat-
tel paper, even if the assignment excludes other rights." U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) 
(Approved Amendments 2010). 
122. See Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 369 F.3d 603, 614 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(discussing how the "majority viewpoint, routinely treat[s] Official Comments to the Code 
that have not been enacted as highly persuasive authority''); Nigel Stark, Note, Unofficial 
Official Comments, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 479, 488 (2007) ("[T]he Official Comments of 
the UCC ... lack the constitutionally prescribed authority to be binding law."). 
123. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5d. 
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Third, the new comment is arguably inconsistent with the im-
mediately preceding paragraph. That paragraph reads: 
In classifying intangible collateral, a court should begin by identify-
ing the particular rights that have been assigned. The account deb-
tor (promisor) under a particular contract may owe several types of 
monetary obligations as well as other, nonmonetary obligations. If 
the promisee's right to payment of money is assigned separately, the 
right is an account or payment intangible, depending on how the ac-
count debtor's obligation arose. 124 
All of this leads up to a concluding remark about legislation by 
comment. It is crucial to distinguish between those situations 
where an amended comment directly conflicts with existing case 
law and those where it does not. 125 Although in both instances the 
comments can be used positively by providing a set of expert 
judgments about what the law should be, it is in the former in-
stance that the comment may fail to create a particularly favora-
ble environment for the development of a uniform commercial 
law. This may be especially true when the comment fails to ex-
plain why the conflicting judicial analysis is flawed. In other 
words, the comment should offer some reason for believing that 
the case law is wrong, rather than simply disparaging its evolu-
tion. It may be, therefore, that until the Code is actually amended 
to address the problem of stripping, the real solution will remain 
elusive. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If the history of the Code and its many revisions and amend-
ments teach anything, it is that the solutions to the problems of 
commercial law do not always come easily. This, in itself, is ales-
son worth remembering, because too often, simple solutions are 
offered without appreciation of the true dimensions of the prob-
lem and its real causes. It was none other than the Chief Report-
er and overall architect of the original Code, Karl Llewellyn, who 
said that "until the rules of law themselves are effectively and 
realistically adjusted to what commerce needs immediately, and 
to what All-of-Us need indirectly, we are doomed to an unfortu-
124. Id. 
125. The Drafting Committee also amended comment 9 to section 8-103 to reject the 
holding of Highland Capital Management LP u. Schneider, 866 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (N.Y. 
2007). U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 13. 
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nate measure of waste in legal work, of unsatisfactory uncertain-
ty and too frequent nonsense in result."126 The challenge for any 
drafting committee is to capture the good and avoid the nonsense. 
All in all, the Article 9 Committee has succeeded. 
126. K. N. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy-Especially in 
Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 178 (1946). 
*** 
